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Defiance or emancipation? 
Peter hallward
What is resistance? Rather than offering a conceptual 
definition, Howard Caygill’s new book* approaches 
resistance as a problematic and elusive practice that 
calls for reflective judgement in the Kantian sense. 
His point of departure is the claim that resistance 
demands appreciation on its own evolving terms, 
rather than as an instance of a more general faculty 
or as a means to some deeper or more normatively 
binding end. Rather than posit a concept up front 
and apply it to a range of examples, then, Caygill 
assembles a constellation of diverse figures from a 
broad ‘archive of resistance’ (13) and works through 
them in order to tease out an interpretation of resist-
ance as a distinctive experience. 
The figures under consideration range from pio-
neers of the revolutionary Marxist tradition (Lenin, 
Luxemburg and Mao) and anti-colonial fighters 
(Gandhi, Fanon, the Zapatistas, the Black Panthers) to 
campaigners like the women of Greenham Common, 
theorists like Freud and Vaneigem, and artists like 
Pasolini and Genet. This range of reference, along 
with the warmth of Caygill’s evident sympathy with 
most of the many characters he considers, is enough 
to set this remarkable book apart from the great 
majority of recent philosophical reflections on our 
contemporary moment, most of which serve, one 
way or another, to help justify quiet acceptance of 
a version of the status quo. Though reluctant to 
return to openly revolutionary motifs (for reasons 
I’ll address in a moment), Caygill’s ‘philosophy of 
defiance’ marks a stirring and striking break with the 
prevailing philosophy of resignation.
The drama that links Caygill’s varied cast of 
characters is his quest to explore what he calls an 
‘affirmative capacity to resist’, understood as an ability 
or ‘energy’ that links traditional virtues like courage 
and fortitude with a readiness to hold one’s ground, 
whatever the cost and for however long it takes. 
Fully committed resistants are those who dedicate 
their lives to the cause they embrace, to the point of 
effectively laying it down in advance and of thereby 
assuming the position of being, as the German Com-
munist Eugen Levin put it, ‘dead men on leave’ (98). 
The Zapatistas in particular offer Caygill an illustra-
tion of what it means to commit to ‘the death in life 
of a resistant’, and at the price of being ready to die 
to a world of oppression and injustice, to escape the 
condition of being held ‘hostage to life’ (126). Perhaps 
the most concise way of describing the theoretical arc 
of the book is as a movement that culminates in an 
affirmation of ‘vital energy’ that nevertheless resists 
an attachment to life as it is currently administered 
or governed. 
The book begins with consideration of Carl von 
Clausewitz’s post-Napoleonic analysis of newly 
powerful forms of ‘military energeia’, forms that have 
become ‘capable of drawing political logic into a self-
destructive escalation of violence’ (20). As Caygill 
explained in the pages of this journal last year, 
Clausewitz has a special place in the history of the 
concept of energy. 
[He was] one of the most consistent users of 
the term before it was taken over in the mid-
nineteenth century by the theory of thermody-
namics, where it remains. He understood energy in 
terms of the Kantian modal category of actuality, 
as an Aktus or event, deviating from the standard 
idealist focus on the modal category of possibility 
and its correlate of freedom.1 
On Resistance builds on this insight drawn from 
Clausewitz’s On War, and explores various ways in 
which resistant energy might be converted into forms 
of life or affirmation. It considers, for instance, with 
Luxemburg, the way that ‘ceaseless economic strug-
gle with the capitalists keeps [the workers’] fighting 
energy alive in every political interval’;2 or, with 
Benjamin, the way ‘interruption and the potential 
vested in the future can serve to energize the capacity 
to resist in the present’ (144); or again, with Vaneigem 
and the Situationists, the way that ‘intensification’ of 
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a ‘level of lived experience’ deeper than the domain 
of ideological representation might fuel ‘a capacity 
to resist that provide[s] the energetic resources for 
actualizing resistance to the spectacle’ (179–80). 
Over the course of their long campaign against the 
British military and its nuclear weapons, the women 
of Greenham Common arrived at an especially clear 
understanding of the link between resistance, energy 
and a committed way of life. As Caygill presents it: 
[their] capacity to resist is actualized, as in Clause-
witz, through energy, but not the destructive 
energy released by nuclear weapons. It is an energy 
capable of arresting the evil course of the world, 
with resistance conceived as an empowering non-
violent interruption of these routines of evil… The 
energizing of the capacity to resist, as in [Gandhi’s] 
Satyagraha, requires concentration and single-
minded attention to the objective of resisting the 
military. (119, 121)
danger! Revolution
Caygill positions his analysis of an ‘affirmative 
capacity to resist’ between two pitfalls. The first 
danger resistants must avoid is that of being dragged 
down into a relation of simple reaction, of being 
extinguished in a logic of retaliation or vengeance. 
This is to collapse resistance into mere violence or 
force. In so far as resistance is understood as force 
it remains ‘essentially determined by the forces 
that oppose it’ (13), and it cannot then move beyond 
reaction to become affirmation. Caygill hitches his 
critique of this impasse to Nietzsche’s critique of 
ressentiment and revenge, and illustrates it with 
reference to Mao and other examples of ruthless 
guerrilla war, where the determination to prevail 
leads the forces of popular resistance to match their 
oppressors in brutality and resolve. Here resistance 
is effectively turned into a pure end in itself, and 
consumes itself in the dynamics of force. The path 
taken in Peru by the neo-Maoist Sendero Luminoso 
indicates some of the political consequences of this 
reduction of resistance to warfare. Caygill’s own ref-
erences include theoretical accounts of domination 
that reduce resistance to a minimum: for instance, 
Arendt’s critique of totalitarianism and Grégoire 
Chamayou’s formulation of the ‘man-hunt’ doctrine, 
which relegates the hunted object of power to the 
brutalized status of ‘prey’ (158). Caygill’s resist-
ance to such reduction explains his preference for 
Vaneigem’s affirmation of creative disobedience and 
our everyday ‘desire to live’ over Guy Debord’s cri-
tique of domination and call for ‘self-emancipation’, 
on the one hand, and over ‘the logic of confrontation 
and its lure of dialectical resolution’ (181), on the 
other.
The second danger that Caygill wants to avoid is 
one that might pull resistance up, so to speak, into 
the apparently simpler or purer domains of con-
sciousness, freedom and reason. Here the danger is 
that resistance might be reduced to the status of a 
mere means to some freely chosen end, and dissolve 
in favour of a crypto-idealist emphasis on inten-
tion or purpose, an emphasis on the prescriptions of 
practical reason or rational will, without adequate 
regard to the conditions of their actualization. Caygill 
associates this danger with Lenin’s neo-Cartesian 
emphasis on ‘clear and distinct class-consciousness’ 
(68) in particular, with the programmatic Marx 
of the Communist Manifesto (30–31) and also with 
centralizing approaches to resistance like the one 
led by Jean Moulin and the French Conseil national 
de la Résistance (12). ‘The exclusive focus of some 
early twentieth-century Marxists on consciousness’, 
Caygill argues, ‘led to the underestimation of the 
concept of resistance that was met by a critique of 
consciousness both in the work of Lukács and outside 
of Marxism by Freud’. According to Caygill, what was 
lost to consciousness was then gained by resistance: 
One outcome of the relegation of consciousness 
to the margins of political action was the re-
emergence of resistance as the expression of the 
new, the unprecedented or the messianic – an 
affirmative understanding of resistance framed in 
terms of interruption and invention rather than 
consciousness. (139) 
A less hard-edged version of this zero-sum game is 
also brought to bear on the relation between resist-
ance and revolutionary practice, again on terms 
rooted in Clausewitz. ‘The emphasis on energy and 
capacity to resist in Clausewitz’s thought distances it 
from revolutionary and reformist projects of realizing 
or conserving freedom.’3 Caygill acknowledges that 
many thinkers have sought to explore the link that 
may exist between resistance and revolution, and 
he lingers in particular over Mao’s effort to make 
sense of forms of peasant resistance as means to 
national and then international revolution (68). On 
balance, though, Caygill considers this effort to be 
problematic and restrictive, and his own concern lies 
not with the dialectical passage from one practice 
to the other so much as with a questioning (after 
Freud) of the ‘assumed affinity between resistance 
and revolution’ that exposes ‘its complicity with 
repression and suppression’ (52), or with a recogni-
tion (after the Zapatistas) of the need to ‘break with 
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the revolutionary project’ in favour of ‘protracted 
resistance to the illegitimate power of the state’ 
(124–5). What Caygill derives from his reading of 
both Gramsci and Benjamin is again ‘the realization 
that enhancing the capacity to resist [is] distinct 
from the revolutionary project of realizing freedom’ 
(146). In an article on the Black Panthers published 
in this journal last spring, Caygill likewise notes 
how ‘the politics of resistance is generically different 
from revolutionary politics’, and stresses that ‘one 
of the major and enduring contributions of Huey 
Newton’s Revolutionary Suicide to the work of the 
Black Panthers, and to radical politics generally, is its 
status as a rare case of theoretical clarity regarding 
the often blurred distinction between revolution and 
resistance.’4 
Overall, Caygill seems more comfortable along-
side Genet in the situation of ‘a vagabond, not a 
revolutionary’ (128), and wherever it presents itself he 
appears to share Genet’s determination to treat ‘the 
mutation of resistance into revolution as one that 
he must resist’ (133). He clearly prefers the energy of 
insurrection over the constituent power and organ-
ized consequences of revolution. 
Insurrection is resistant but not constituent, 
opening spaces rather than constituting them and 
mobilizing a rhetoric of action, even violent action, 
to inspire its uprisings. Perhaps it is now a more 
salient term than revolution, with its promise of 
completed movement, placing beside this a sense of 
sustained defiance appealing to a capacity to resist 
that can disappear, return or re-emerge later and 
elsewhere, always surging up, resistant in the face 
of counter-resistance. (199)
Caygill takes it more or less for granted that the 
route which restricts resistance to matters of mere 
consciousness or purpose is a dead end, and he dis-
patches the issue with some relatively brief appeals to 
Nietzsche and Freud, and by pitting Vaneigem against 
Debord, or Luxemburg against Lenin. By contrast, the 
route that links resistance and violence, at the risk of 
our first pitfall, sees rather more two-way traffic. If 
the general movement from reactive to affirmative 
resistance shapes the overall theoretical dynamic 
of the book, by the same token it provides Caygill 
with his point of departure and recurring point of 
reference, in the work of von Clausewitz. With some 
justification, Caygill suggests that Clausewitz’s cel-
ebrated treatise On War (posthumously published in 
1832) is best understood as a study of resistance. The 
purpose of war, Clausewitz explains, is to render one’s 
enemy ‘incapable of further resistance’. Against a 
background conception of a world shaped by relations 
of enmity and the unpredictable hazards of conflict, 
much of On War is dedicated ‘not only to compromis-
ing or annihilating the enemy’s capacity to resist, but 
also to preserving and enhancing one’s own capacity 
in the face of the enemy’s application of force’ (10). 
Among the several things that Caygill derives from 
Clausewitz’s approach, alongside his well-known 
analysis of how unbridled warfare can spiral out of 
political control, is a typology of the forms of energy 
that these warring capacities can assume, from the 
‘solid’ ranks of a conventional army through the 
more ‘liquid’ mobility of the French Revolutionary 
armies to the ‘gaseous’ dispersal of partisan resist-
ance to an occupying force. Clausewitz counters the 
unprecedented threat of ‘liquid violence’, in the form 
of Napoleon’s mobile columns, with an alternative 
dynamics of ‘vaporization and condensation’ charac-
teristic of new forms of guerrilla war. 
From the defeat of the massed solids of the armies 
of the Ancien Régime by the liquid mass of the 
revolutionary army emerges the People’s War 
(Volkskrieg) of episodic and pointillist attacks, mo-
mentary condensations of an intangible political 
vapour or cloud that is the actualization of a new 
capacity to resist. (24)
As I’ve already suggested, Caygill is particularly 
struck by the way Clausewitz uses ‘the term “energy” 
in its classical Aristotelian, pre-thermodynamic 
sense’ to describe war as the ‘actualization or the 
bringing to event of a political logic with varying 
degrees of intensity’ (20). Clausewitz conceives ‘actu-
ality as energy – that which makes something happen, 
that which provokes events (sometimes described 
as Aktus)’, and ‘it is essential for him that things do 
not happen just because they are possible or that 
someone willed them to happen – events depend as 
much on enmity and chance as on the free will of a 
subject.’ Napoleon’s reckless invasion of Russia, for 
instance, was thwarted by a mixture of bad luck and 
the steps taken by his enemy to resist him. Accord-
ing to Clausewitz, this sort of outcome needs to 
be understood in terms of actuality, rather than 
possibility.
Events for Clausewitz are acts and not the outcome 
of possibilities – they are singular conjunctures 
in which chance and enmity are salient: his point 
of departure is the predicament of risk and not 
the expression of freedom. This is very far from 
Hegel’s dominant version of post-Kantian phil-
osophy where enmity and chance and the un-
predictable quality of events are swept up into a 
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speculative unity driven by the realization of the 
idea of freedom.5
Although Clausewitz accompanies Caygill as a 
point of reference through to the end of the book, the 
limits of his account are indicated in advance, by its 
initial configuration in terms of enmity and war. It 
is hard to escape the logic of self-destructive escala-
tion if the issue remains framed in these terms, and 
Caygill has little difficulty in showing how twentieth-
century readings of Clausewitz (by Kojève, Aron and 
then Girard) all fail to convert the Clausewitzian 
conception of protracted warfare into a sustainable 
practice of equally protracted but affirmative resist-
ance. Schmitt’s attempt to come to terms with ‘the 
epoch of total resistance’ (105) stands condemned 
for the same reason, in so far as ‘absolute enmity 
provokes a war of annihilation in which any politi-
cal negotiated peace is ruled out’ (110). All of these 
post-Clausewitzian accounts suffer, in short, from 
an inability to distinguish affirmative from merely 
reactive or destructive practices of resistance.
The main question that needs to be addressed 
to Caygill’s book is this: how far does it succeed in 
avoiding a similar impasse?
Resisting politics
However you answer this question there’s no denying 
that Caygill, to his credit, makes no attempt to dodge 
it. He recognizes, right from the start, that the 
practices of resistance and defiance are themselves 
neutral or disorientated. They can be invoked to 
describe counter-revolutionary attempts to withstand 
popular pressure for change just as easily as they can 
be summoned to counteract colonial oppression or 
capitalist exploitation. Recourse to defiance per se 
does not settle the question of what is thus defied – 
injustice, or the efforts of those battling to eliminate 
it. The preface to Caygill’s book (the section that he 
admits he found the hardest to write) already bears 
eloquent though rather tortuous witness to the com-
plexity of the term and of the political orientations it 
can harbour, via consideration of how mobilizations 
both for and against the continuation of the French 
war to maintain Algeria as a colony could, in 1960–61, 
seek legitimacy through appeal to the ambiguous 
legacy of the earlier French resistance to Nazi occupa-
tion. The anti-Nazi Resistance, with a capital R, in 
France as in several other European countries, can 
be remembered either as an exemplary instance of 
autonomous popular self-determination, or as an 
essential moment in the reconsolidation of the state. 
Rather than rig in advance an answer to the question 
of whether resistance ‘in itself ’ might be understood 
as progressive or reactionary, Caygill’s preface accepts 
that there is nothing in the concept or practice of 
resistance that might decide the issue. He insists on 
the multifaceted complexity of the experience. 
There is never a moment of pure resistance, but 
always a reciprocal play of resistances that form 
clusters or sequences of resistance and counter-re-
sistance responding to each other in surrendering 
or seizing initiative. (5) 
It is precisely this complexity that leads Caygill 
to approach his topic with the resources of reflective 
rather than determinant judgement, as a concept 
whose ‘conceptuality includes within it a counter-
movement to both unification and dispersal’. Any 
individual case of resistance, then, ‘does not only 
demand a change in the concept or rule of judgement, 
but actively resists its subsumption under such a 
concept or rule’ (7).
Caygill’s choice of Clausewitz as his primary 
point of reference is itself an indication of his topic’s 
political inflection, or lack of it. Clausewitz’s first 
campaign as a Prussian soldier was the 1792–93 
assault on revolutionary France, and he devoted most 
of his military career to campaigns that sought to 
resist the consequences of this revolution (and, in 
particular, of its imperialist perversion). For all the 
differences between Prussia’s Junker-dominated mili-
tary machine and the guerrilla wars that Clausewitz 
observed in Spain or Russia, they have in common 
a resistance to both French imperial invaders and 
French revolutionary ideas – and they share this 
resistance with contemporaries that include the 
‘superb’ fighters of the Vendée, whom Clausewitz 
evokes in passing, and those Caribbean plantation 
owners and their acolytes, unmentioned by Clause-
witz, who during these same years did everything they 
could to resist their slaves’ self-emancipation in the 
soon-to-be-independent republic of Haiti. Kant’s own 
notorious critique of revolution and rejection of the 
right to rebel against an unjust government can like-
wise be invoked to sanction the status quo as easily 
as it can be deployed, by readers of a different political 
orientation, to condemn counter-revolutionary defi-
ance of the new order of things.6 So long as we keep 
our focus on Clausewitz’s contemporaries, it would 
be hard to dispute the commonplace recognition 
that the most fertile poetic articulations of themes of 
resistance should be attributed to variously counter-
revolutionary and Romantic opponents of this new 
order, be it political, social or economic. 
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Both the politics and the pathos of resistance, 
then, can be harnessed to causes that seek as much 
to restore as to undermine the established order. 
Caygill appears to accept this point without flinching, 
although it is perfectly clear that his own sympathies 
lie firmly in the anti-establishment camp. The main 
examples of resistance that he explores and endorses 
involve opposition to colonialism, racism, milita-
rism and exploitation. If a leader like Gandhi figures 
prominently in the book, it is only in his role of 
principled and progressive resistant, one who masters 
the transition from violent anti-colonial ressentiment 
to a post-violent affirmation of resistance to oppres-
sion in general. Caygill does not dwell on Gandhi’s 
other and perhaps more troubling resistances: to 
modern technology, for instance, or to revolutionary 
internationalism, or to grassroots struggles against a 
collaborationist police force, and so on. On occasion, 
Caygill risks some confusion by appearing to lend 
resistance a degree of political orientation after all, 
as when he observes that 
resistance is motivated above all by a desire for 
justice, its acts are performed by subjectivities 
possessed of extreme courage and fortitude and its 
practice guided by prudence, all three contributing 
to the deliberate preservation and enhancement of 
the capacity to resist. (12)
If, like Gandhi, the women of Greenham Common 
figure here as exemplary resistants, it’s because they 
cultivate and sustain, over the long term and in the 
face of relentless repression, such a desire for justice 
– a ‘resistant subjectivity possessing the capacity to 
stage a protracted non-violent resistance’, together 
with a ‘fragile but also resilient’ network of support 
whose virtual capacity to resist ‘could be energized 
at any moment’ (117). What is common to the 
Greenham women, to the Black Panthers, and to 
Gandhi and the Zapatistas, is an appreciation of 
resistance as ‘an energy that gives you the power to 
overcome powerlessness’, as a ‘vital capacity’ or ‘spir-
itual energy’ that provides the courage and ‘strength 
to endure the consequences that will follow from 
challenging the state’ (119–20, citing the Greenham 
Common Women’s Peace Camp’s 1989 Resist the 
Military). By the time he has reached the end of his 
book, Caygill is ready to define resistance as a prac-
tice ‘engaged in defiant delegitimization of existing 
and potential domination but without any prospect 
of a final outcome in the guise of a revolutionary or 
reformist result or solution’. The resulting ‘politics 
of resistance is disillusioned and without end’, but 
it can also
claim a lifetime or a life for its pursuit of justice. … 
The defiant life is not negative, not just the reac-
tion to the ruses of an eternally renewed effort to 
dominate nested within freedom itself, but one 
with its own necessities, its own affirmations and 
its own joy. (208)
Once his analysis of resistance has progressed a 
certain distance from its Clausewitzian foundation, 
of all the figures discussed in the book Caygill’s own 
position begins most to resemble that of the writer 
and perennial fellow traveller Jean Genet. Genet 
appeals to Caygill as a writer who 
saw himself first and foremost as a resistant and 
not a revolutionary, one who led a life of resist-
ance opposed to the self-deceiving rhetoric of both 
the state and its revolutionary opponents. … The 
mark of Genet’s resistance to brutality and to the 
brutalizing of resistance is evident throughout the 
controversial postures he adopted alongside the 
Black Panthers, the Palestinians and the Red Army 
Faction in West Germany. Genet always insisted 
that he stood beside these movements, never 
within them. (128)
Genet is a writer who stands stubbornly alongside 
those who resist, but he is forever prepared to resist 
them in turn, should they allow revolt or resistance 
to slide into the trap of ‘organized revolution. Genet, 
in short, is an anti-revolutionary, a resistant who will 
continue to resist the revolution that he has himself 
provoked’ (131–2).
Partisans of the actual
Caygill offers a sympathetic reading of each of the 
figures he considers. The question persists, however: 
what justifies the association of resistance per se with 
the pursuit of social justice and vital affirmation, 
other than the thematics and practice of affirmation 
itself? Once resistance as such is taken as the object 
of analysis, and once it is recognized as independent 
of any particular political orientation, what then 
might align it with what still appears, for lack of a 
more neutral or adequate term, as a form of ‘progres-
sive’ politics? 
The most obvious, most familiar answer to this 
problem would be to link resistance to the practice 
of emancipation. If resistance is defined first and 
foremost as resistance to oppression, domination 
or coercion, then engagement in resistance would 
itself involve some appeal to the normative criteria 
of freedom and the work of self-liberation. Caygill 
pointedly rejects this option. He worries that the 
political pursuit of emancipation can itself be led 
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to justify new forms of oppression and domination. 
More importantly, he insists that the modality of 
resistance per se must be understood, with and after 
Clausewitz, in terms of the Kantian category of actu-
ality rather than that of possibility, and the freedom 
associated with it. Caygill insists on the fact that 
Clausewitz was and should remain excluded from the 
philosophical ‘line of descent that privileges the idea 
of freedom. This line, moving from Kant through 
Fichte, Hegel and Marx, remained obsessed with the 
problem of freedom and its aporias of autonomy, 
sovereignty and self-legislation.’7
This is the most important and most weighted 
theoretical move in the book. It is worth pausing 
to consider its implications. In his Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant’s breakdown of the general categories of 
the understanding includes, along with the categories 
of quantity, quality and relation, three basic catego-
ries of modality: possibility, necessity, and actuality 
or existence (Dasein). Like all of the categories, these 
correspond to three equally basic forms of judge-
ment. ‘Problematic judgments are those in which 
one regards the assertion or denial as merely possible 
(arbitrary). Assertoric judgments are those in which it 
is considered actual (true) [wirklich (wahr)]. Apodictic 
judgments are those in which it is seen as necessary.’ 
A problematic proposition, Kant explains, is one that 
‘only expresses logical possibility (which is not objec-
tive), i.e., a free choice to allow such a proposition to 
count as valid, a merely arbitrary assumption of it in 
the understanding’. As examples, Kant cites proposi-
tions which assert, without justification, that the 
world might be governed by ‘perfect justice’, or, alter-
natively, that ‘the world exists through blind chance’.8 
The modal categories, Caygill notes, determine ‘the 
relation of a subject to the totality of appearances’, 
and ‘a focus on possibility leads directly to the cen-
trality of the idea of freedom – that a subject is free 
with respect to appearances’ (17).
Caygill makes a convincing case for why Clause-
witz should be read as a partisan of the actual rather 
than the merely possible. Clausewitz’s ‘focus on actu-
ality, energy and Aktus’, Caygill argues, ‘testifies to his 
fascination with Kant’s modal category of actuality, 
which distinguishes him and his teacher Kiesewetter 
from the contemporary fascination with Kant’s modal 
category of possibility’ (17). This means, in turn, that 
if Clausewitz can be read as a post-Kantian thinker 
then it is on terms opposed to Kant’s own emphasis 
on practical freedom and the capacity for autonomy 
or self-legislation it appeared to underwrite. This 
is where Kant remains closest to Rousseau and to 
the revolutionary practice that Rousseau helped to 
inspire. ‘The philosophical apparatus inherited from 
Kant, Fichte and above all Hegel’, Caygill recognizes, 
‘was adapted to the political logic of revolution and its 
view of freedom as autonomy that privileged granting 
oneself laws. Since Rousseau, laws were legitimated 
by being our laws given to ourselves and which it 
would be literally folly to oppose’ (21).9 For Clause-
witz, however, who endured some of its unanticipated 
consequences, this emancipatory or revolutionary 
political logic was ‘incapable of comprehending the 
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violence it had itself actualized, let alone a violence 
which rejected it along with all the privileges it gave 
to autonomy and reason’ (21). Clausewitz’s reaction 
was to turn his back on the prevailing ‘fascination 
with freedom’: ‘in place of freedom, Clausewitz is 
interested in the Akt or actuality of war’, and his 
‘model of historical action was less the realization of 
freedom through the exercise of free will than the 
management of violence released by the workings of 
chance and enmity’ (17–18). 
On this score, Caygill appears to side with Clause-
witz unequivocally. ‘The modality of possibility’, he 
concludes, ‘is not consistent with resistant subjectivity; 
resistant subjects are not free, they must inhabit actu-
ality’ (210). Again, ‘the resistant subject does not enjoy 
freedom; on the contrary, the resistant subject finds 
itself in a predicament that does not admit the luxury 
of possibility. In this sense … resistant subjectivities 
deviate from the modern, revolutionary adventure 
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of the pursuit of freedom through autonomy inau-
gurated by Rousseau and Kant’ (97). This conclusion 
endures even when the theoretical frame of reference 
itself changes significantly, as when Caygill pivots 
from Clausewitz to the subject of one of his earlier 
books, Emmanuel Levinas. For Caygill, what emerges 
in Levinas ‘is an implacable description of resistant 
subjectivity, one which does not enjoy freedom as 
autonomy but which finds itself in a predicament of 
survival’, obliged to endure ‘a life whose time is not 
secure and guaranteed but is only provisionally won 
or secured against chance and adversity’ (96).
without freedom
This uncoupling of resistance from freedom inflects 
the whole of Caygill’s subsequent account, with 
respect to both the paths he follows and those he 
rejects or neglects. Strikingly, he neglects Kant’s 
own most significant conceptualization of freedom; 
that is, freedom not merely as an implication of the 
modal category of possibility, or as derivative of any 
other aspect of the understanding, but as a necessary 
implication of what really matters both to Kant and 
to many of his immediate followers – the practical 
exercise of pure reason. The arbitrary ‘freedom’ of 
indeterminate possibility counts for nothing in rela-
tion to a transcendental freedom we might presup-
pose as cause and author of its own law-giving acts. 
Only a rational being endowed with free will, Kant 
argued, could be capable of the autonomy required 
to issue universally binding moral imperatives, 
including the sort of imperative, to resist oppres-
sion or injustice, that appears to be tacitly assumed 
throughout Caygill’s account. Once we accept the 
exclusively actual dimension of resistance, how 
then are we to understand Caygill’s own occasional 
recourse to the prescriptive voice, as when he notes 
in passing that ‘effective resistance should be much 
more than fervent resentment’ (163), or when he 
sketches counter-factual scenarios in his preface and 
afterword?10 
Caygill’s Clausewitz further rejects Hegel’s 
reworking of the category of actuality (Wirklichkeit) 
in terms of the more concrete mediations that shape 
‘objective spirit’; that is, in terms of historically and 
institutionally determinate practices of freedom. The 
play of chance and enmity, dominant in Clausewitz’s 
account, are ‘not effects that could be carried through 
to some dialectical resolution and brought to yield a 
positive result; indeed, chance and enmity stand as a 
sign for the ruin of any dialectical endeavour’ (17–18). 
Yet Caygill skips rather quickly over this point, and a 
post-Hegelian effort to interpret relations of enmity 
in terms of historically determinate forms of actu-
ality (for instance the reasons that might underlie 
class struggle or the dynamics of exploitation, or 
that might account for imperialist forms of primi-
tive accumulation) is not so much demonstrated to 
be futile as dismissed in advance as inadequate or 
distracting. If the goal is more to resist forms of 
oppression than it is to overcome or transform them, 
then indeed dialectic appears to have little to offer.
Rather than try to reconstruct the logic that might 
underlie social conflict and orient the practice that 
could eventually overcome it, Caygill appears to 
follow Clausewitz in assuming that the social world 
is essentially structured in terms of enmity and thus 
war – an enmity that figures here almost as a quasi-
transcendental condition of our possible political 
experience, without any historically determinate 
prospect of reconciliation. Relations of enmity are 
effectively given as a point of departure, and between 
two enemies the range of possible outcomes seems to 
be limited to mutual exhaustion, to mutual annihila-
tion, or to destruction of the weaker party by the 
stronger. In each case, the outcome is determined 
essentially by the balance of power, by the relative 
difference in levels of political and military strength. 
Once resistance is uncoupled from both freedom and 
autonomous moral imperatives, on the one hand, and 
Hegelian or Marxist versions of dialectical reconcil-
iation, on the other, what remains is hard to distin-
guish from a recognition that right is only a function 
of might – and that might is ultimately a function 
of energy or life. Once resistance is severed from 
practices of emancipation or self-liberation, what 
appears to sustain it as an enduring and affirmative 
capacity are only the rather obscure neo-Nietzschean 
resources of endurance and affirmation themselves. 
The priority is to cultivate forms of courage and 
perseverance, along with the forms of community 
and solidarity that might nurture them. Resistance 
can then be embraced as a ‘form of life’, as sustained 
for instance by ancestral memories in Chiapas, or by 
‘the contagious formation’ of planes of friendship 
and community affirmed by Tiqqun (197).11 At certain 
points in the discussion, it becomes difficult to distin-
guish Caygill’s affirmative resistance from the more 
limited and problematic notion of resilience.12 
to do our will
Caygill builds up his notion of our affirmative capac-
ity to resist on the basis of a series of alternatives 
that he tends to treat as mutually exclusive: either 
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resistance or revolution, actuality or possibility, defi-
ance or emancipation, endurance or freedom, enmity 
and chance or dialectical necessity… The option 
of thinking actuality and possibility together, for 
instance, is not so much refuted as excluded from 
consideration. This effectively disjunctive a priori 
approach creates two sorts of difficulties with this 
account: one concerns the interpretation of some of 
the figures Caygill includes, the other concerns an 
alternative that he excludes. 
Let’s take the exclusion first. Caygill wants to build 
on the link that relates resistance to the traditional 
virtues of courage and fortitude, while breaking or at 
least bracketing the link that might relate resistance 
to emancipation and in particular to revolutionary 
processes of self-emancipation. As a result he blocks 
consideration of what I take to be the most fertile 
and most consequential attempt to think these prac-
tices together: namely, the attempt anticipated by 
Rousseau’s conception of political virtue and voli-
tion, and then practised in different ways by what 
might be called the revolutionary–voluntarist or 
Jacobin–Bolshevik tradition that runs from Marat 
and Robespierre through Blanqui to Lenin, Gramsci 
and their contemporaries. Caygill effectively accepts 
the French Revolution as an inaugural moment in 
the history of his theme – both in his choice of 
Clausewitz as theoretical guide and in his eventual 
acknowledgement of Babeuf as originary resistant 
(192) – but his reluctance to think resistance together 
with revolution sets strict limits to his discussion of 
the episode and its consequences.
What Rousseau offers is precisely an account of 
freedom understood as a more or less generalizable 
capacity. Rousseau insists both that ‘the principle 
of every action is in the will of a free being’, such 
that free people only do what they will – but also 
vice versa, that they only will what they can do.13 
A person’s freedom ‘doesn’t consist in doing merely 
what he wants, but rather in never doing what he 
does not want to do’14 and the point is that any 
actual determination of this conjunction of being 
and willing is never given in advance, but emerges as 
more or less general over the course of disciplined or 
‘virtuous’ emancipatory practice.15 What Rousseau’s 
Jacobin admirers subsequently cultivated is not 
simply an ability to resist the predations of absolute 
monarchy and feudal privilege; they organized the 
power needed to overcome them. The French and 
Haitian Revolutions certainly involved all kinds 
of resistance to domination and to slavery; more 
importantly, though, they managed to transform 
such resistance into capacities to abolish slavery and 
to eliminate certain kinds of domination. The chief 
résistants, in this foundational drama, are not the 
sans-culottes or the Jacobins but, on the contrary, 
the king and his ministers. It is Louis XVI and those 
who defend him, followed by those who mourn him, 
who resort to all available means to resist the new 
forms of popular empowerment and the new threats 
these pose to the old class hierarchies. As for Marat 
and Robespierre, what they urge is not so much to 
resist these enemies of the people as it is to take the 
steps necessary to defeat them. From the moment it 
begins, the course of the revolution will depend on 
the capacity of the people to formulate and impose 
their collective will as sovereign command, and 
to oblige their former rulers to respect it. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Bastille’s fall, Marat 
recognizes that the decisive question is now how 
far the aristocracy will succeed in containing the 
damage that has already been done, and in limiting 
the concessions forced on them by popular pressure. 
It would be ‘the height of madness’, Marat argued 
after a year of relative deadlock and reaction, ‘to 
pretend that people who for ten centuries have been 
in a position to rob and oppress us with impunity 
will simply accept with good grace to become our 
equals; they will endlessly scheme against us’, and 
they will resist the new egalitarian order with every 
weapon in their arsenal.16 
Are the people organized and prepared to do what 
is required to overcome those who oppress them, 
yes or no? This is the question that the people of 
Paris eventually answered in August 1792, and that 
the people of Saint-Domingue (Haiti) would decide 
ten years later. As C.L.R. James notes, the wars of 
resistance to Napoleon that convulsed Spain and 
then Russia were first ‘anticipated and excelled 
by the blacks and Mulattoes of the island of San 
Domingo. … For self-sacrifice and heroism, the men, 
women and children who drove out the French 
stand second to no fighters for independence in any 
place or time.’ And the reason, James concludes, 
was itself perfectly ‘simple’: ‘They had seen at last 
that without independence they could not maintain 
their liberty.’17 Versions of this same question were 
subsequently taken up by Blanqui, then Lenin, and 
then Che, Fanon, Giáp and many others. But it is 
a question that Caygill prefers to leave to one side. 
One result is that when he talks about resisting 
oppression, or exploitation, or neoliberalism (173, 
185), it is not always clear whether what he has in 
mind involves enduring them, or wearing them 
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down over time, or actually overcoming them. The 
distinction is too important for equivocation: there 
is a world of difference between resisting slavery in 
the sense of enduring or surviving it, and resist-
ing slavery as part of an emancipatory process that 
might abolish it. 
The alternative that Caygill excludes, in other 
words, is one that might link capacity and virtue, on 
the one hand, with autonomy and volition, on the 
other, as suggested by the old motif, enshrined in the 
great constitutional documents of the French Revo-
lution, of an egalitarian, emancipatory ‘will of the 
people’. Practices of resistance, from this perspective, 
can be assessed in terms of the normative criteria of 
voluntary and inclusive popular self-determination – 
that is, less as an apparent end in itself than as means 
to the end of actualizing an egalitarian will. The old 
truism remains true, that to will the end is to will the 
means – and to deny or downplay the link between 
ends and means is to close down any prospect of 
realizing your ends. Clausewitz himself hints at such 
an approach, when in his opening definition of war 
he encourages us to imagine it as a ‘duel on a larger 
scale’, or as the struggle of ‘a pair of wrestlers’. ‘Each 
tries through physical force to compel the other to do 
his will; his  immediate aim is to throw his opponent 
in order to make him incapable of further resistance. 
War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our 
will.’18 Caygill repeatedly cites Clausewitz’s formula-
tion of the immediate aim, but never cites the final, 
italicized sentence of this quotation, and so tends to 
downplay its actual purpose: our need to overcome 
an enemy’s resistance only arises in so far as that 
enemy refuses to do our will. From a Clausewitzian 
perspective, if war is the ‘continuation of political 
action through its mixture with other means’ (19), it 
would seem that the effort to wear down or exhaust 
the enemy should still be understood as the extra-
political means to a voluntary or political end. By 
putting the issue in these more Rousseauist terms, 
we can then draw on the resources of neo-Jacobin 
political theory and practice in order to distinguish 
the kinds of will that can rightly compel general 
assent from those that cannot.
conjunctural actuality
Caygill’s disjunctive approach also complicates his 
interpretation of some of the figures he does include 
in his account of resistance, notably figures who are 
more easily understood in terms of revolution. In 
order to read Marx’s account of the Paris Commune 
as a polyvocal instance of affirmative politics, for 
instance, Caygill first goes out of his way to read it 
via Nietzsche’s jarring condemnation of the Com-
munards as driven by ressentiment and vengeance. 
He wants to show that more was at stake than a 
mere rebellion of the oppressed. That is certainly 
true, but it would have been simpler, I think, to leave 
Nietzsche’s own reactionary resistance to socialism 
and democracy to one side, and to recognize more 
emphatically that what matters for Marx in this 
sequence is less ‘resisting Empire’ (39) than revolu-
tionary social transformation in the full and proper 
sense, initiated through the introduction of ‘govern-
ment of the people by the people’. What matters is 
the imposition, in the teeth of ruthless opposition, 
of that ‘political form at last discovered under which 
to work out the economical emancipation of labour’.19 
This whole emancipatory project, as Marx recon-
structs it, is premissed on an understanding that ‘the 
political rule of the producer cannot coexist with the 
perpetuation of his social slavery’;20 and it unfolds in 
keeping with his guiding principle that ‘the eman-
cipation of the working classes must be conquered 
by the working classes themselves.’21 The problem, 
then, is not how to resist capitalist exploitation but 
how best to ensure that a revolution might last long 
enough, and go far enough, to destroy it. And as is 
generally the case with Marx, the decisive issue is a 
matter of power, mastery and autonomy, rather than 
of resistance per se. While he regrets their subsequent 
hesitation and lack of military resolve, Marx quotes 
the Communards’ inaugural declaration (of 18 March 
1871) with approval. 
The proletarians of Paris, amidst the failures and 
treasons of the ruling classes, have understood that 
the hour has struck for them to save the situation 
by taking into their own hands the direction of 
public affairs. … They have understood that it is 
their imperious duty and their absolute right to 
render themselves masters of their own destinies, 
by seizing upon the governmental power.22
It is when he comes to read Lenin and Luxemburg, 
however, that the consequences of Caygill’s decision 
to isolate resistance from revolution become most 
apparent. Lenin’s agenda could easily be described 
in terms of his effort to pick up where the Commu-
nards left off, with the conjunction between popular 
autonomy and the seizing of governmental power: 
the Russian proletariat is that unique revolutionary 
actor whose historical mission and conscious purpose 
is to establish the former by directing the latter. 
Buoyed by a boundless confidence in the ‘initiative 
and energy of class-conscious fighters’, the Lenin of 
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What Is To Be Done? believes that ‘the time has come 
when Russian revolutionaries, guided by a genuinely 
revolutionary theory, relying upon the genuinely 
revolutionary and spontaneously awakening class, 
can at last – at long last! – rise to full stature in all 
their giant strength.’23 As Lars Lih has demonstrated 
in detail (in a book that Caygill cites and appreciates), 
if Lenin’s revolutionary optimism came to prevail as 
the dominant voice in the Russian party during its 
early years of polemic and division it was because he 
best reflected the outlook of the grassroots militants 
or committed praktiki across Russia. As one of the 
latter put it, this was because Lenin ‘generalized in 
masterly fashion the organizational experience of 
the best praktiki’.24 
Rather than emphasize the characteristic con-
junction in Lenin’s work between heroic ideals and 
practical work (and between conscious purpose and 
social constraint, between political principles and 
historical analysis, between revolutionary aspiration 
and economic tendency, strategic possibility and con-
junctural actuality, etc.), Caygill emphasizes instead 
the single dimension of consciousness as the medium 
in which an apparent tension between resistance and 
revolution is played out. ‘Contrary to Marx’, Caygill 
argues, ‘Lenin’s text is obsessed with the philosophy 
of consciousness’; with Lenin it is ‘the quality of 
consciousness that distinguishes mere resistance 
to capitalism from its revolutionary overthrow’ (43). 
Merely elemental, spontaneous or defensive ‘trade-
union’ style consciousness tries to improve the terms 
by which workers must sell their labour-power, 
without challenging the capitalist relations of pro-
duction per se; mature proletarian consciousness, 
by contrast, breaks with reformism and resolves to 
take the revolutionary steps that alone can secure 
collective ownership of the means of production. 
Since in both cases it is a matter of consciousness, 
the question of organization can be framed in terms 
of the process whereby (to evoke Lenin’s recurring 
metaphor) the one might shift, ripen or ‘grow up’ into 
the other – the process whereby the less conscious 
might become more so. As an inadequate mode of 
consciousness, Caygill recognizes that ‘resistance 
cannot in Lenin’s terms constitute a revolutionary 
subject’; its ephemeral ‘flashes’ and ‘flickerings’ will 
always need correction or training by revolutionary 
theory (45). However, Caygill downplays the degree 
to which Lenin treats more and less ‘advanced’ or 
purposeful forms of awareness less as terms of an 
opposition than as poles of a continuum, and thus as 
moments of a transition or an education.
Rather than follow Lenin’s apparent ‘subsumption 
of resistance under the protocols of the philosophy 
of consciousness’ (46), Caygill prefers Rosa Luxem-
burg’s alternative conception of political organiza-
tion. According to Caygill, Luxemburg’s approach 
is modelled less on matters of conviction or con-
sciousness than on ‘biological metamorphosis’ and 
a ‘biopolitical discourse of vitality and health’ (49). 
With Luxemburg, consciousness now ‘ followed the 
movement and metamorphoses of resistance, it did 
not direct it’ (47). Freed from conscious direction, 
political practice can now be understood instead as 
‘an internally differentiated vital phenomenon’, as 
‘an autopoietic process of correction and challenge 
expressed in a dynamic response to an environment’, 
or as a ‘dynamic conflict and expansion of forces 
whose actions produce involutions’ and convolutions. 
Each passing wave of resistance leaves ‘traces of its 
passage in the sand, changing the environment of 
future struggle’, as so many ‘eddies in the stream of 
becoming’ (48–9). Luxemburg’s break with the model 
of consciousness, Caygill concludes, 
liberated resistance from the tutelary role given it 
in Lenin’s theory. The consistency or coherence of 
individual acts of resistance is not produced by a 
conscious synthesis but emerges through a process 
of metamorphosis. The testing of the hostile en-
vironment through resistance leaves an archive of 
traces inscribed on both the capitalist environment 
and the emergent organization of the revolutionary 
proletariat. The history of such acts of resistance 
has its own consistency, which is not that of con-
sciousness but retains experience of past struggles 
while remaining oriented towards the future. (49)
Caygill is right to draw attention to these dif-
ferences between Lenin and Luxemburg. Rather 
than reinforce their divergence, however, I think 
that reflection on current political practice stands 
to gain more from remembering, notwithstanding 
the differences, their multiple points of overlap and 
convergence. Both sought to link contemporary 
forms of emancipatory resistance to preparation for 
revolutionary struggle, and both committed their 
lives to the ‘actuality’ of the latter. Both stressed the 
importance of theoretical clarity, deliberate purpose 
and political will, and both framed these aspects of 
‘consciousness’ in an analysis of the economic and 
historical tendencies of global capitalism. One may 
have been more lucid than the other about what 
victory might require, and one more clairvoyant 
about the ultimate costs of such a victory. But does 
today’s political theory really need more emphasis on 
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vital energy and complex environments, rather than a 
renewal of conscious purpose and theoretical clarity?
The same disjunctive approach inflects Caygill’s 
brief engagement with Lenin’s two most widely read 
followers, Lukács and Gramsci. Caygill recognizes 
that consciousness is an important theme in Lukács’s 
History and Class Consciousness, of course, and he 
knows that Lukács criticizes Luxemburg for her 
naive trust in the ‘organic’ movement of history and 
thus for ‘underplaying of the role of the party in the 
revolution’ and for belittling ‘its conscious politi-
cal action’.25 However, without much in the way of 
immediate textual evidence, Caygill argues, never-
theless, that ‘Luxemburg’s critique [of Lenin] forced 
Lukács into a philosophical and political confronta-
tion with the problem of consciousness which led 
beyond consciousness towards a theory of affirmative 
or inventive resistance’, a theory exemplified in ‘the 
works of art and philosophy which point to potential 
sites of resistance to reified culture and conscious-
ness’ (50–51). Furthermore, he continues, ‘it was this 
possibility of forms and sites of resistance beyond 
the philosophy of consciousness that stimulated the 
thought of Adorno, Benjamin and the Frankfurt 
school’ (51). Later in his book, Caygill adds Gramsci 
to the list of thinkers who sought to filter a newly 
inventive conception of resistance through ‘a subtle 
undermining of any focus on consciousness’ (140). 
Caygill touches on important aspects of all these 
thinkers, but it would be more accurate to say that 
neither Benjamin nor Gramsci lost their appreciation 
of the importance of revolutionary consciousness. 
‘The consciousness [Bewußtsein] that they are about 
to make the continuum of history explode’, Benjamin 
recognizes in his final text, ‘is characteristic of the 
revolutionary classes at the moment of their action’,26 
while much of Gramsci’s work is dedicated to an 
analysis of the modes of organization and aware-
ness that contribute to the ‘formation of collective 
wills’, and of the processes whereby ‘such wills set 
themselves concrete short-term and long-term ends’ 
and then either take, or fail to take, the steps needed 
to implement them.27 The same Gramsci who aims ‘to 
put the “will”, which in the last analysis equals practi-
cal or political activity, at the base of philosophy’28 
also defines the will as a ‘consciousness of ends, 
which in turn implies having an exact notion of one’s 
own power, and the means to express it in action’.29 
On the other hand, if Adorno and Horkheimer did 
indeed distance themselves from anything resem-
bling Lenin’s heroism or Gramsci’s voluntarism, in 
the 1940s and after, it was surely in large part as a 
result of the conclusions they drew regarding the 
apparent futility of resistance, first in the face of 
fascism and then in the face of commodification and 
the fully administered society.
Caygill’s reading of Fanon might serve as a final 
example of the price he is willing to pay in order to 
preserve his modal distinctions. With good reason, 
Caygill celebrates Fanon’s contribution to both 
the psychological and the political dimensions of 
resistance, and rightly draws attention to the way he 
underlines the necessity of rebellion in the face of 
insufferable oppression. In the conclusion to his Black 
Skin, White Masks, for instance, Fanon recognizes that 
if the colonized inhabitants of French Indochina have 
begun to rebel, it is not because they have ‘discovered 
a culture of their own [but] because “quite simply” it 
was, in more than one way, becoming impossible for 
them to breathe’.30 It would be hard to imagine a more 
emphatic assertion of the actuality of resistance. In 
the same text, however, and just as emphatically, 
Fanon recognizes that he has ‘one single duty [un seul 
devoir]: that of not renouncing my freedom through 
my choices’. Precisely because ‘I do not have the duty 
to be this or that’, because I am not obliged to be 
black or to pretend to be white, because ‘I am not the 
prisoner of history’ and so ‘should not search it for 
the meaning of my destiny’ – so then my one duty is 
to accept and cultivate my freedom, and to persist in 
the ongoing ‘creation of myself ’.31 We are not so far, 
here, from a version of Kant’s prescription, that one 
should not use oneself or others as means to an end. 
Against the grain of Caygill’s reading, Fanon 
stresses the need to think the actuality of both neces-
sity, actuality and possibility, in an emancipatory dia-
lectic whose essential ambiguity is already expressed 
in his own choice of modal verb. With its literal 
meaning of duty and obligation, devoir or on doit 
means both ‘one must’ and ‘one should’, and there is 
nothing to be gained by trying to pry these meanings 
apart. What is essential is instead, as Fanon repeat-
edly puts it, to treat resistance to domination and a 
capacity for emancipation as aspects of one and the 
same revolutionary process, one that he formulates 
precisely in the neo-Rousseauist terms of a general 
or popular will. What will decide the outcome of the 
imminent ‘African Revolution’ is the determination 
of the ‘will of the people’, the ‘national will of the 
oppressed peoples’, their ‘will to independence’, their 
‘will to break with exploitation and contempt’, and 
so on.32 Any consideration of revolutionary Algeria in 
particular, Fanon insists, must recognize ‘the will of 
twelve million men; that is the only reality’.33
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With all of these figures, from Marx to Fanon and 
after, there is indeed an important distinction to be 
drawn between resistance and revolution, between 
vitality and consciousness, and between endurance 
and emancipation. No one has done more than 
Caygill to explore the line that separates them, and to 
show what may be achieved when we isolate the one 
from the other. There is more to be gained, however, 
by trying to reconnect them.
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